Communal tension a prime security threat

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INFO PAPUA : Editorial/ Opinion : Media Opinion

Communal tension a prime security threat
By Jakarta post.com
Jan 4, 2008, 22:42

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Jakarta post.com
January 03, 2008

Communal tension a prime security threat
Opinion News - Thursday, January 03, 2008
Sidney Jones, Jakarta
The security outlook for Indonesia in 2008 is reasonably good. The biggest
danger lies not in terrorism, separatism, election disputes, or any external
threat, but in poorly managed communal tensions that have the potential to
fray this country's social fabric.
The fact that the climate change conference could be held for two weeks in
Bali at the time of year that used to be called "bombing season" is an
indication of how far fears of terrorism have fallen. The likelihood of
another attack along the lines of Bali I or II in the new year is low.
Most extremist groups here have concluded that indiscriminate attacks on
civilians are counterproductive, but they have not given up on local
targets, even if their capacity to go after them is weak.
The execution of the three Bali bombers is likely to generate anger, and in
a statement posted on the Internet in mid-December, Mukhlas exhorted his
followers to show their support by turning out in massive numbers for his
burial. If there were to be retaliation for the executions, it likely would
be against Indonesian government installations or personnel, but careful
security arrangements should be able to prevent any incident.
(Despite the court decision earlier this year upholding the
constitutionality of the death penalty, the Indonesian parliament would do
well to abolish it. Quite apart from the human rights arguments against
capital punishment, its politicized use in this country too often serves to
fuel rather than ease social tensions.)
The weakness of salafi jihadi groups at the moment does not mean that they
are on a slow steady path to eradication. On the contrary, Jamaah Islamiyah
is trying to sterilize and consolidate its ranks; various Darul Islam groups
are reaching out to disgruntled members of other organizations; and new
groups are emerging and recruiting members, particularly in Java.
The government needs to be thinking not just about how to "deradicalize"
about-to-be-released prisoners but how to provide options other than jihadi
career paths to children in vulnerable areas who are now in their early
teens.
Separatism has not gone away but neither is it a threat to Indonesian
stability. The conflict in Aceh is no longer military but political, over
how much authority Jakarta will cede. There are security problems in the
province, some of them linked to the problems of poorly administered
reintegration funding, but they do not appear to have the potential to
trigger renewed fighting. In that sense, the peace is secure. Local politics
will heat up before the 2009 elections, but isolated incidents of violence
are not likely to spread.
In Maluku, there will always be a small group of RMS (Republic of the South
Moluccas) supporters who raise their flag on April 25 in Haruku and other
traditional strongholds, but Jakarta's fear of separatism there is overblown
-- the spectacle of pro-RMS dancers breaching presidential security in Ambon
earlier this year notwithstanding. Hostility between the TNI and police in
Maluku (and elsewhere) is a greater danger to the population than anything
the RMS could dream up.
Papua will remain a problem in 2008, but the danger will not come from the
OPM or outside agitators. It will continue to be from the cumulative impact
of years of neglect of basic social services, unprosecuted past human rights
violations, rapacious security forces and uncontrolled migration from
elsewhere in Indonesia, with a divisive and unnecessary process of pemekaran
-- administrative fragmentation -- further roiling the waters. Governor Bas
Suebu and his overstretched advisers are doing their best to move forward,
but the obstacles they face are enormous.
The Yudhoyono government is not helping matters by restricting access of
journalists and NGOs. The stories that come out of the interior will not be
pretty, but they could expose some of the sources of Papuan resentment that
in turn could lead to better policy-making.
Authorities at all levels of government need to understand the social,
political and environmental risks that palm oil investment can bring; they
should use 2008 to undertake a thorough analysis of the social costs thus
far of the Sinar Mas enterprise, now scheduled for major expansion.
Poso is a place to watch in 2008. Largely calm since police operations in
January 2007, it remains a place where unresolved grievances could still
come to the surface and, like Aceh and Papua, where poorly monitored funds
thrown at a problem can create as many tensions as they solve.
Corruption of humanitarian funds has been a huge issue in Poso; with
additional funding given to prisoners and ex-prisoners involved in the
conflict with no clear criteria for how recipients are selected and no
accounting for the funds, the likelihood of new resentments is high.
As far as 2008 local elections go, one that may carry a risk of trouble is
the East Java governor's race, where the impact of the LAPINDO mudflow
disaster will be an issue. But in general, outbreaks of election-related
violence have been easily localized and there is no reason to believe the
East Java race will be any different.
Likewise, while the maneuvering for the national 2009 elections may bring an
increase in rent-a-mob demonstrations, using various economic grievances as
a theme, there is nothing on the horizon that suggests a potential for the
phenomenon Indonesia most dreads, urban riots.
That leaves one big unresolved issue facing the country in 2008: Communal
tensions. Protecting minority rights may be the government's biggest
security challenge, and there are various ways in which its neglect of this
fundamental function is undermining the national slogan, "unity in
diversity".
Attacks by local Muslim vigilante groups on "illegal" churches, the
beleaguered Ahmadiyah community and "deviant" sects picked up in 2007 and
are likely to continue in 2008. Police have made few arrests in the face of
mob action on the part of groups like the Anti-Apostasy Alliance (AGAP) in
West Java.
Not only did the Yudhoyono government make no serious effort to punish the
attackers or stress the importance of freedom of religion, but instead it
endorsed the views of the conservative Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis
Ulama Indonesia, MUI) that such religious groups themselves are a greater
threat than their attackers because they provoke community hostility.
It is not clear why religious vigilantism has been such a problem in West
Java -- one theory is that aggressive Protestant evangelicalism there has
made inroads in strongly Muslim communities, creating fears of
"Christianization"-- but Muslims considered "deviant" have been victims
almost as often.
The problem is that the success of vigilantes at a local level has national
implications and can encourage similar attacks in Lombok, where the
persecution of Ahmadis has been unremitting, or West Sulawesi, where the
risk of local political conflict taking on a communal dimension remains
high.
Once communal tensions are inflamed, they can be exacerbated by local power
struggles. (That said, since direct local elections were instituted in 2005,
Indonesian voters consistently have rejected extremist candidates.)
The government has also failed to roll back local regulations that
discriminate against non-Muslims, when it has a clear legal mandate to do
so, under both the Indonesian constitution and the decentralization laws
that left religion as the responsibility of the central government. The
result is a palpable sense among many non-Muslims, in North Sulawesi, Bali,
Papua and elsewhere, that they are becoming second-class citizens in their
own country.
In Manokwari in early 2007, that sense was one factor leading the local
district council to propose, in an equally reprehensible move, that the city
be designated a "Christian city" with some restrictions on other faiths. The
proposal was not adopted but it led to efforts by some hardline Muslim
groups to scope out the possibility for stirring up communal conflict there,
and the story is not over.
Playing religious favorites or tacitly endorsing one version of the truth is
a dangerous game in a country as diverse as Indonesia. Unless Jakarta takes
a tougher stance against vigilantes and in favor of religious freedom and
minority rights, internal security problems are likely to increase.
The writer is Senior Adviser International Crisis Group.

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Communal tension a prime security threat